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NOTES
THE ONE YEAR PROVISION OF THE
KENTUCKY STATUTE OF FRAUDS
Kentucky Revised Statutes section 371.010 states: "No action shall
be brought to charge any person... (7) Upon any agreement that is
not to be performed within one year from the making thereof unless...
some memorandum or note thereof be in writing and signed by the
party to be charged ... " I
This of course is a standard Statute of Frauds provision, copied
virtually verbatim from the original English Statute of Frauds enacted
in 1677 during the reign of Charles II.' It is the purpose of this note
to review the manner in which Kentucky has interpreted this section
of its Statute of Frauds.
'he problems of interpretation have centered around three key
phrases in the Act: (1) the meaning of the word "agreement"; (2) the
meaning of the phrase "not to be performed within a year"; and (3)
the meaning of the word "year" as used in the Statute.
Meaning of the word "agreement'
The word "agreement" does not necessarily mean "promise." While
in common parlance the two terms are often used synonymously, it is
evident that for many purposes the two terms cannot be used inter-
changeably. For example, the performance of a promise requires only
acts by the promisor. The performance of an agreement, on the other
hand, requires that both parties to the agreement act. The word
"agreement" carries overtones of mutuality; "promise" does not. That
the legislature intended the two words to be used differently might be
inferred from the fact that subsection (8) of this same section uses the
words "promise, agreement or contract."2 It could be argued that by
129 Chas. 2, c. 3 (1677): "No action shall be brought . . . to charge the
defendant ... upon any agreement that is not to be performed within the space
of one year from the making thereof... unless the agreement... is in writing."
Compare, Restatement, Contracts, sec. 178 V (1932): "The following classes
of informal contracts are by statute unenforceable unless there is a written
memorandum thereof signed by the party against whom enforcement of the
contract is sought.... (V) Bilateral contracts as long as they are not fully per-
formed by either party, which are not capable of performance within a year from
thfe time of their formation ......
2 Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 371.010 (1953) "No action shall be brought to charge
any person: ... (8) Upon any promise, agreement, or contract ... for the sale or
lease of any real estate ....
Noms
including both words the legislature recognized that they have different
meanings. However, other portions of the statute lead one to conclude
that the legislature regarded the two words as synonyms. In subsection
(6) of this same section,3 the legislature declared unenforceable agree-
ments in consideration of marriage, but said nothing about promises or
contracts in consideration of marriage. It is unthinkable that this ex-
clusion was intended, and a rather cursory examination of the cases
arising under this subsection shows that the courts have treated this
language as stigmatizing agreement, promise and contract alike.4 It is
therefore impossible to tell from the text of the statute whether the
legislature intended to make a distinction between the words "agree-
ment" and "promise." However, an analysis of the cases arising under
the subsection dealing with contracts not to be performed within a
year shows that the courts have made a distinction between the two
words.
This is shown by the fact that Kentucky has uniformly held that if
one side of an oral bilateral contract has been performed within a year,
the counter-promise is enforceable even though performance must ex-
tend over a period of more than a year."r Apparbntly the court has
never distinguished between a bilateral contract fully performed on
one side, and a unilateral contract, but the same principle would un-
doubtedly apply. This same result is reached under the Restatement
rule which applies only to "bilateral contracts so long as they are not
fully performed by either party.... -6
Note that the Restatement removes from the Statute of Frauds bi-
lateral contracts which have been fully performed on one side pre-
sumably even when this performance necessarily extended over a
period longer than one year from the date the contract was made. It is
uncertain as to whether the Kentucky Court of Appeals would go so
far. In every case examined, the performance had been completed
within the year following the formation of the contract and Professor
Williston believes that this is required according to the majority rule.7
But Kentucky has apparently never been squarely presented with the
3 Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 371.010 (1953) "No action shall be brought to charge
any person: ... (5) Upon any agreement made in consideration of marriage,
except mutual promises to marry....
4 Stevens v. Niblack's Admr, 256 Ky. 255, 75 S.W. 2d 770 (1934); Hatcher-
Powers Shoe Co. v. Sparks, 237 Ky. 321, 35 S.W. 2d 564 (1931); Wesley v.
Wesley, 181 Ky. 145, 204 S.W. 165 (1918).
G Fergerson v. Rieke, 223 Ky. 321, 2 S.W. 2d 405 (1928); E. Tenn. Tel. Co.
v. Paris Elec. Co., 156 Ky. 762, 162 S.W. 530 (1914); Jones v. Comer, 25 Ky. L.
Rep. 773, 76 S.W. 392 (1903); Dant v. Head, 90 Ky. 255, 13 S.W. 1073 (1890);
West v. King, 163 Ky. 561, 174 S.W. 11 (1915).
6 Restatement, Contracts op. cit. supra, note 1.
7 2 Williston, Contracts 1472 (Rev. ed. 1936).
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issue and might go along with the Restatement at least in the case
where performance was possible or contemplated within the year,
though not actually given until later. For example, in Dant v. Head,8
the classic Kentucky case on this question, it was stated, as dicta, that
the statute was not to apply "to an agreement that is to be, or has been
performed by one or either" of the parties within a year. (Emphasis
supplied). Thus we see the extent to which complete performance by
one side will remove such an agreement from the statute. There is
dictum in at least one Kentucky case to the effect that part perform-
ance within the year of one of the promises is sufficient to take the case
outside the Statute of Frauds.9 But whenever the issue has been
squarely presented, part performance has been held insufficient.' 0
According to the Restatement," if either of the promises made in a
bilateral contract cannot be performed within a year, the entire agree-
ment is within the statute of frauds, and even the side of the contract
which can be performed within a year is unenforceable, unless it is
in writing.12
The Kentucky Court has never been faced with this problem. None
of the cases examined presented a situation in which a plaintiff, whose
oral promise would require for its performance a period greater than a
year, was seeking to enforce the oral counter-promise which could be
performed within a year. But in East Tennessee Telephone Co. v. Paris
Electric Co.,'3 the Court said, "The contract is within the statute...
when it is clearly made to appear that it would not and could not be
performed by both parties within the year." (Emphasis supplied).
This principle is in accord with the Restatement view and, while not
the actual holding of the case, it should not be regarded lightly since
it appears in one of the leading Kentucky cases on the subject.
However, there have been dicta in the Kentucky cases to the effect
that instead of putting both promises of a bilateral contract within
the Statute of Frauds when one promise cannot be performed within
the year, neither promise should be within the statute.14 This view is
8 Supra note 5.
9 Utilities Elec. Machine Corp. v. Joseph E. Seagram & Sons, Inc., 300 Ky.
69, 187 S.W. 2d 1015 (1945).
10 Mulberry v. Kitchen, 247 S.W. 2d 380 (Ky. 1952); see also Purcell v.
Campbell, 261 Ky. 644, 88 S.W. 2d. 670 (1935); Kleeman & Co. v. Collins, 72
Ky. (9 Bush) 460, 464 (1872).
11 Restatement, Contracts, see. 198, illustration 4 (1932).
12 Or, of course, unless the other side has performed. See discussion, supra.
This is similar to the requirement of "mutuality " in contract law, but is not the
same. The mutuality referred to there is mutuality of obligation, not of enforce-
ability. A contract is not void for want of mutuality because one side is unenforce-
able for some reason. 13 156 Ky. 762, 162 S.W. 530 (1914).
14Bastin Tel. Co. v. Richmond Tel. Co., 117 Ky. 122, 77 S.W. 702 (1903);
Dant v. Head, supra, note 5.
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apparently based on the feeling that the statute is completely inopera-
tive as applied to such a contract. However, this seems contrary to the
weight of authority and the East Tennessee Telephone case probably
states the law.
It appears, then, that the Kentucky Court treats the word "agree-
ment" to mean any bilateral contract which is still executory (i.e. not
yet fully performed by either party) at the end of one year. This hold-
ing is in accord with what appears to be the majority rule. However,
the court has never specifically repudiated the Restatement position
that if fully performed on one side, even though that side could not
possibly have been performed within a year, the contract is without
the statute, and the Kentucky courts may well see fit to adopt that view
when presented with such a case.
Meaning of the phrasc: "is not to be performed within a year"
Generally, an agreement "is to be performed within a year" when
performance by both sides is possible within one year from the date
the contract was formed.'15 Obviously a contract stating that it is to
be performed within a year is not included within the statute. A con-
tract specifically stating that performance by both sides will continue
over a period greater than a year is as obviously within the statute. 16
The problem occurs when no time is stated for performance.
A common example of an agreement which may be performed
within a year though no time is set for performance is a promise to
insure. This type of contract is usually without the statute since most
insurance contracts can be completely performed within a year by the
happening of the event insured against, followed by the payment of
the proceeds due under the policy.' 7 But a promise to re-insure prop-
erty for successive annual periods was held to be within the statute,
since it could not be performed within the year.'8
Another type of agreement which illustrates this, and is common
enough to deserve special treatment, is a promise the performance of
which is terminated by the death of someone, usually the promisor or
the promisee, but occasionally a third party. Since death could occur
15What happens when only one side can be performed or is performed is
discussed above.16 At least until one side has fully performed and even then only if the broader
Restatement view is adopted. See text, supra.17 Brown v. Home Ins. Co. of N.Y., 203 Ky. 715, 262 S.W. 1088 (1924);
Springfield Fire and Marine Ins. Co. v. Snowden, 173 Ky. 664, 191 S.W. 439
S1917); Amer. Central Life Ins. Co. v. Leake, 31 Ky. L. Rep. 1016, 104 S.W. 373
1907).
18 Klein v. Liverpool & London & Globe Ins. Co., 22 Ky. L. Rep. 301, 57
S.W. 250 (1900).
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within the year the agreement could be fully performed on both sides
within the year. Hence a promise to support someone for life is not
within the statute,19 nor a promise to give another property at the
donor's death,20 nor a promise to support a child.21 The Kentucky
Court has sometimes failed to distinguish between a promise which
is performed upon the death of some person and one which is excused
by his death.22 For example a promise to support a child until he is
twenty-one cannot be performed within a year. However, death of the
child would certainly excuse performance. The layman will not criti-
cize the court for refusing to distinguish these cases and in fact would
regard such a distinction as over-technical, but to the lawyer such dis-
tinctions have apparently seemed significant.23
An analogous situation is presented when a contract which by its
express terms is to extend over a period greater than one year contains
a "termination clause" permitting one of the parties to declare it at an
end. This is generally held to be within the Statute of Frauds for the
reason that the law looks to the performance, not to the defeat of a
contract. Apparently Kentucky has never been faced with this problem
specifically but there are dicta which indicate that Kentucky might
well look upon such a contract as one capable of being performed
within a year and therefore without the statute.24
It is sometimes stated that all negative promises are without the
Statute of Frauds since a promise not to do something can be per-
formed by the promisor as well dead as alive, in fact, better, since
death guarantees actual performance. This would put without the
statute even those contracts in which a person is to refrain from doing
something over a definite period of years. However, the more logical
view would place this type of contract within the statute, since it is
obviously impossible to forbear to do something for a period greater
than a year within a year. Death guarantees performance but it does
19Waggener v. Howsley's Adm'r., 164 Ky. 113, 175 S.W. 4 (1915); Bull v.
McCrea, 47 Ky. (B. Mon.) 422 (1848); Howard's Adm'r v. Burgen, 34 Ky. (4
Dana) 137 (1836).2OMcDaniel v. Hutcherson, 136 Ky. 412, 124 S.W. 384 (1910); Story v.
Story, 22 Ky. L. Rep. 1731, 61 S.W. 279 (1901); Myles Ex'rs v. Myles, 69 Ky.
(6 Bush) 237 (1869); see also: Thomas v. Feese, 21 Ky. L. Rep. 206, 51 S.W. 150
(1899).
21 Myers v. Saltry, 163 Ky. 481, 178 S.W. 1138 (1915); Stowers v. Hollis,
83 Ky. 544, 7 Ky. L. Rep. 549 (1886); Osborn v. Osborn, 12 Ky. Op. 361 (1883).
22 Myers v. Saltry, supra note 21.
23 The effect of making this distinction is to let the form rather than the sub-
stance of a contract control whether it's within the statute. See Williston, op. cit.
supra, note 7, 1454 for a fuller development of this idea.24 Finley v. Ford, 304 Ky. 186, 200 S.W. 2d 138 (1947); Stone v. Smith, 2979
Ky. 218, 130 S.W. 2d 18 (1939); Mullikin v. Miles, 204 Ky. 541, 264 S.W. 1086
(1924).
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not constitute performance. The Kentucky Court of Appeals adopted
this view in a well reasoned opinion in the case of Dickey v. Dickin-
son,25 the leading Kentucky case on the subject. The court specifically
repudiated the doctrine that all negative contracts are without the
statute. However, when no definite time is stated for performance of
a negative promise the Kentucky courts have held the Statute of Frauds
inapplicable on the grounds that this should be construed as a promise
for life. A good example of such a contract is an agreement to refrain
from going into a competing business.
26
Under the Restatement rule, if the contract is in any way capable
of being performed within a year the contract need not be in writing.27
However Kentucky does not treat contracts so liberally. Rather it is
required that the parties must contemplate performance within a year
or at least not contemplate performance extending over a period of
more than a year.28 The courts however have been extremely incon-
sistent in interpreting this exception. For example, contracts to per-
form certain obligations as long as a particular business shall exist have
uniformly been held to be without the statute,29 though it is almost
certain the parties really intended for the business and the performance
to continue over a long period. On the other hand, the court has
scrutinized the unexpressed intention of the parties very closely in
lumbering contracts, as a rule, holding that if the lumbering could not
be performed within a year with the contemplated equipment the
statute barred enforcement of the promise.30 Likewise, agreements
concerning the use of roads3' and electric lines 32 have been generally
held to be unenforceable since full performance was not contemplated
within a year. The same result was reached in a case where per-
25 105 Ky. 748, 49 S.W. 761 (1899).
20 Nickel] v. Johnson, 162 Ky. 520, 172 S.W. 938 (1915); Dickey v. Dickin-
son, 105 Ky. 748, 49 S.W. 761 (1899).
27 Restatement, Contracts sec. 178 (1), (V) and sec. 198, especially Com-
ment b, example 11.2 8 Williamson v. Stafford, 301 Ky. 59, 190 S.W. 2d 859 (1945); King v.
MeMillan, 293 Ky. 399, 169 S.W. 2d 10 (1943); Kentucky Utilities Co. v. Hurst,
207 Ky. 448, 269 S.W. 525 (1925); Cumberland & Manchester R. C. v. Posey,
196 Ky. 379, 244 S.W. 770 (1922); E. Tenn. Tel. Co. v. Paris Elec. Co., 156 Ky.
762, 162 S.W. 530 (1914).
20 Frankfort and Cincinnati Ry. Co. v. Jackson, 153 Ky. 534, 156 S.W. 103
(1913); Yellow Poplar Lumber Co. v. Rule, 106 Ky. 455, 50 S.W. 685 (1899).3 0 Williamson v. Stafford, supra note 28. King v. McMillan, supra note 28.
But see Niagara Fire Ins. Co. v. Layne, 162 Ky. 665, 172 S.W. 1090 (1915). To
some extent this overlaps with the "Sale of Standing Timber" section of our
Statute of Frauds, Ky. Rev. Stat. sec. 371.100 (1953).
31 Lively v. Elkhorn Coal Co., 101 F. Supp. 1014 (E.D. Ky. 1952).
32 Bastin Tel. Co. v. Richmond Tel. Co., supra note 14; E. Tenn. Tel. Co. v.
Paris Elec. Co., supra note 28.
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formance was to continue until a construction job was finished and the
completion was expected to take several years. 33
A promise to perform for more than a year or until the happening
of some event that could occur within a year, does not lie within the
Statute of Frauds.34 Also it might be observed that the mere fact that
a promise provides a period greater than a year for performance does
not place the promise within the statute if it could be performed within
one year from the date made.3
5
Definition of a year
The general rule is that the year expires at midnight on the first
anniversary of the day the promise is made.36 Thus the year is virtually
always 365 days plus several hours.37 This definition also disregards
leap years, so the year could be 366 days plus. Thus it would seem
that a promise to work for a year does not fall within the statute if per-
formance is commenced the following day, since the worker will have
completed his year with the employer at the end of the work day on
the first anniversary of the contract. Apparently the Kentucky Court
of Appeals has never been specifically faced with this problem. The
case of Torson Construction Company v. Grant8 is sometimes cited as
so holding, but in that case the court construed the plaintiff's beginning
work on the day following the promise as an act indicating his ac-
ceptance of the defendant's offer. The Kentucky Court has had no
trouble with the simpler ramifications of this problem, holding con-
tracts to work for one year, commencing on the day made, to be with-
out the statute 9 and those for periods of greater than a year, 40 or those
for a year to commence in the future,41 barred by the statute.
Much litigation has arisen concerning leases of one year which
were not in writing. Many suits have sought to enforce such parol
33 Cumberland and Manchester R.R. v. Posey, supra note 28.34 Standard Oil Co. v. Denton, 24 Ky. L. Rep. 906, 70 S.W. 282 (1902).
35 Morton v. Roll, 201 Ky. 27, 255 S.W. 817 (1923). But see Mills v.
O'Daniel, 23 K.L.R. 73, 62 S.W. 1123 (1901).
36 Restatement, Contracts op. cit. supra note 1, sec. 198 Comment d.
37 Compare the length of a year for Statute of Frauds purposes with that for
statute of limitation purposes. There the year is deemed to expire at midnight on
the first anniversary of the day prior to that from which the time commenced to
run. Geneva Cooperage Co. v. Brown, 124 Ky. 16, 98 S.W. 279 (1906); Wilson v.
I.C.R.R., 29 Ky. L. Rep. 148, 92 S.W. 572 (1906).
38251 Ky. 800, 66 S.W. 2d 79 (1933).
39 Ross v. Columbus Mining Co., 204 Ky. 474, 264 S.W. 1071 (1924).
40 Dysart v. Dawkins Log & Mill Co., 222 Ky. 415, 300 S.W. 906 (1927);
Bethel v. Booth & Company, 115 Ky. 145, 72 S.W. 803 (1903).
41 Tarry v. Vick, 214 Ky. 317, 283 S.W. 87 (1926); Smith v. Theobald, 86
Ky. 141, 5 S.W. 394 (1887).
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agreements42 presumably relying on Kentucky Revised Statutes 371.-
010(6) 43 which states that a lease for a year or less need not be in
writing. However this still will be barred by subsection 7 since it can-
not be performed within a year,44 unless, of course, the lessee's term
commences on the day the lease is made. 45 If the lease is to commence
in the future, it is within the statute.46
Conclusion
It is submitted that the Kentucky Court of Appeals has in general
reached the proper conclusion in most of the problems discussed. It
is felt, however, that the Court should not have placed within the
statute contracts whose performance was not contemplated within a
year, even though possible within a year. Such a rule merely adds to
the tremendous uncertainty already in the law. While probably the
majority view, it is not that adopted by the Restatement, which is be-
lieved by the writer to be the preferable one.
The Kentucky courts have not been unmindful of the injustices
possible under the statute. They have joined the courts of the English-
speaking world in according the statute a narrow, most unfriendly in-
terpretation. Furthermore, strictly construed, the statute does not pre-
42Boone v. Coe, 153 Ky. 233, 154 S.W. 900 (1913); Thomas v. McManus,
243 Ky. L. Rep. 837, 64 S.W. 446 (1908); Hayden v. Clark, 32 Ky. L. Rep. 1841,
108 S.W. 845 (1907); Moore v. Terrell, 33 Ky. L. Rep. 822, 11 S.W. 297 (1908).
4The section of the Kentucky Statute of Frauds dealing with the sale of
interests in land.
44 Generally speaking, the fact that a contract is not obnoxious to one section
of the Statute does not mean that it is free from objection under another section.
2 Williston, op. cit., supra note 7, sec. 1461. However, there is some authority
for the view that the specific provisions of the Statute should govern, and the
general sections, here that dealing with contracts not to be performed within a
year, should yield. 49 Am. Jur. 406 (19443).
45 This seldom occurs except when the lease is created by implication when a
tenant for a year holds over on a parol agreement. See for example, Abraham v.Gheens, 205 Ky. 289, 265 S.W. 778 (1924). . .
40 A judge known to the writer has stated that in his opinion this provision
of the Statute of Frauds has resulted in more injustice than any other part. The
scheme is generally worked in connection with a share-cropping arrangement.
In December, say, the landlord will promise a tenant that he can work his farm
and live on it for the next calendar year, from January through December. Then,
in January, when it's too late for the cropper to get anotherplace since such
arrangements usually run from January to January, the landlordwill inform the
tenant that he has several others after the same place and that the tenant's lease
is unenforceable. With no other job available to the tenant, the landlord is in a
position to drive a hard bargain. Today, the paucity of good tenants renders this
less common, but it was widely used during the depression. Relief could be af-
forded the tenant by construing this to be a contract to grow crops, which could
of course be performed within a year. Burden v. Lucas, 19 Ky. L. Rep. 1581, 44
S.W. 86 (1898). The court could also give relief if actual fraud on the part of the
landlord could be shown. 49 Am. Jur. 885 (1943). This, however, is extremely
difficult to prove.
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vent the plaintiff from seeking relief in quasi contract.47 It has also
been suggested by the Court of Appeals that the promisee might rely
on a promise, ordinarily within the statute, as a defense, since this
does not involve "bringing an action."48 Sometimes the courts invoke
an ordinary estoppel and refuse to permit the promisor from using the
statute as a bar.49
Perhaps the best protection to the layman is the amazingly wide-
spread belief that all contracts must be in writing in order to be legally
enforceable. Thus to some extent, the layman's ignorance protects him
from injustice. If he expects to have a legally enforceable contract, he
will require it to be in writing.
The Statute of Frauds is not without its critics.50 Yet every Ameri-
can jurisdiction has adopted the Statute of Frauds. 51 The possibility
of repeal is summed up by Professor Corbin: "The total repeal of the
statute would involve such a wrench to the mental habits of bench
and bar that it is very unlikely to occur."5 2
Possibly the effects of that section of the statute dealing with con-
tracts not to be performed within a year could be ameliorated by
lengthening the statutory period. For example, to require a writing
for contracts which could not be performed within, say, fifteen months,
would remove from the statute most agreements for the duration of a
year, e.g. agreements to work for a year, since performance of such
agreements would usually be commenced within three months from
the date of the promise and thus capable of complete performance
within the statutory period.
It has been observed that every line of the Statute of Frauds has
cost a king's ransom. It is submitted that ransoming kings with money
taken from honest, well-intentioned, fair-dealing, though ignorant per-
sons, should be as severely limited as possible and that the Statute of
Frauds should be liberalized. Since little help can be expected from
the legislature in this endeavor, it is the writer's opinion that the un-
cordial attitude of the courts toward the statute should be com-
mended, not deplored.
Tom Soyars
47 Bethel v. Booth & Co., supra note 40; Weber v. Weber, 25 Ky. L. Rep.
908, 76 S.W. 507 (1903).
48 Bellew v. Gregory, 174 Ky. 418, 192 S.W. 492 (1917).
49 See Purcell v. Campbell, supra note 10.50 See the list of articles collected at 2 Corbin, Contracts, 8, 9 (1950).
51 Forty-six states have re-enacted the main provisions of the Statute of
Frauds. Another, New Mexico, has the statute by virtue of judicial decision and
the forty-eighth, Maryland, has it because of a clause in its constitution. Corbin,
op. cit. supra note 50, 10, note 12.
52 Id. at 14.
